The military balance pdf

Each entry is cross-referenced to a comprehensive A—Z glossary. Regional and select country entries cover the major developments affecting defense policy and procurement, and defence economics. Worry less because you can check out Stuvera. If you require more PDF books, the the military balance pdf free download and the iiss the military balance pdf are advised. You can be guaranteed to discover any high-quality books you require here. The Military Balance pdf free Download is widely recognized as the authoritative assessment of the military capabilities and defense economics of countries.

The Military Balance Pdf Download features new chapters on Eritrea, Kosovo, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, updated chapters for Armenia and Venezuela, and the usual array of statistics tables providing the latest data on defense budgets and expenditures, force levels including military training establishments , naval fleets and battle tanks.

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Secretary of Defense. Home The Military Balance Popular Books. Canada also maintains armedforces members on six-month rotations supporting and training Ukrainian security forces.

This commitment, called Operation Unifier, currently runs until March In August , Canada completed a year-long operation to support the UN stabilisation mission in Mali. The government has made much of its ambition to be a security actor in the Asia-Pacific and again deployed two frigates to the region in The requirement is currently set at 88 new aircraft, to enter service from However, the Harry DeWolf class has been criticised for being underequipped for its role, in terms of its weapons fit and its capacity to operate in thick ice.

This was followed by an announcement of plans for six new icebreakers. Canada has also announced a plan to modernise and enlarge its fleet of CH Cormorant helicopters in order to continue providing searchand-rescue capabilities in the Arctic. The defence review reaffirmed commitments to NATO, but also to modernising capabilities, including cyber power. The review promised to increase regular and reserve forces, with particular enhancements in the areas of cyber and intelligence.

Meanwhile, the deployments of frigates and submarines to the NATO theatre and the Pacific demonstrate continuing blue-water naval capabilities. The review pledged to finally deliver on a range of delayed procurements. Canada maintains a well-developed range of mainly small and medium-sized defence firms. The strongest sector is in combat vehicles and components, though the government is using its latest naval procurements to establish a long-term national shipbuilding strategy. Includes DoD funding, as well as funds for nuclear-weapons-related activities undertaken by the Department of Energy.

A missile-defence review was published in January envisaging a number of new programmes and technologies, including space-based systems, to respond to a more challenging and evolving threat environment. In August the Pentagon established a new Space Command as a precursor to the creation of a space force, a White House plan that has fuelled debate over the best way to integrate space into national-security policy.

The US maintains an all-volunteer force, including significant reserves, with high levels of training throughout all command and service levels. However, readiness remains a concern. Modernisation priorities include a renewal of strategic nuclear capabilities, including a new class of ballistic-missile submarine and a new long-range bomber, and a major recapitalisation of air assets across the services.

In August , the US withdrew from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and three weeks later conducted a ground-launched cruise-missile test. During the US Navy was carrying out a new force-structure assessment, which could adjust the long-term plan for a ship combat fleet. The US also continues to actively develop its defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. The country has the strongest defence industry globally, with a dominant position in the international defence market, although a report to President Trump warned that key areas of the defenceindustrial base were eroding, which could have consequences for the defence supply chain.

Civilemergency responses can be mobilised by state governors. Martin; 1 LCpl Roy M. Page; 1 Maj. Bernard F. An MEU usually consists of a battalion landing team 1 SF coy, 1 lt armd recce coy, 1 recce pl, 1 armd pl, 1 amph aslt pl, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bty, 1 cbt engr pl , an aviation combat element 1 medium-lift sqn with attached atk hel, FGA ac and AD assets and a composite log bn, with a combined total of about 2, personnel.

The army wants to field a system with a basic combat capability by China, France, Japan and Russia are also developing hypersonic glide vehicles. Dassault withdrew the Rafale in late Canada identified a requirement to replace its Hornets as far back as and selected the Lockheed Martin F in This decision was then put on hold before the contest was relaunched in General Dynamics Land Systems will design a vehicle using contemporary technologies, while SAIC will develop a vehicle that is based on technologies yet to fully mature.

The marine corps is also extending the service life of its over LAVs to the mids. The US Navy wanted a class of over 50 ships designed to operate in coastal shallow waters and perform anti-submarinewarfare, mine-countermeasures and surface-warfare missions. It would also develop mission packages for each role that could be changed depending on the required task.

Increased automation and greater reliance on shore-based logistics would also enable a smaller crew. The plan was that three crews would rotate between two ships, with one of these forward-deployed and the other training or working-up the plan. Troubled status However, by the end of only 19 LCSs were in service.

The plan is to now build 35 hulls. In late , the navy decided to buy both the Freedom- and Independence-class designs. The argument was that reduced seaframe costs allowed both to be procured; the navy could therefore obtain ships more rapidly; and that it would improve investment in the naval-shipbuilding sector.

However, both Congress and government auditors said that operating two different ship classes would lead to higher maintenance, training and upgrade costs. Meanwhile, all three mission packages are behind schedule and, although the surface-warfare package achieved initial operating Freedom class LCS 1 Independence class LCS 2 capability IOC in , this was in part because the navy temporarily reduced the minimum requirements.

All three mission packages are due to reach IOC in The future A programme review in saw the crew plan replaced. A mission package would be attached to each LCS, which would then be grouped into a surface division, based on their common role. The LCS programme is at a crucial point. The final Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate was retired in and the 11 Avenger-class mine-countermeasure vessels are approximately 25—30 years old.

At the same time, reflecting current concerns, the navy is planning to build a larger, more heavily armed and more expensive FFG X frigate. But in the meantime, the navy needs the LCS to begin operating with its forward-deployed fleets. By November, Turkish forces were organising joint patrols in northern Syria with Russian personnel. This is to allow the Alliance to deploy 30 battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat ships to NATO within 30 days. However, European capability gaps are unlikely to close within the next decade.

Moreover, some would considerably widen after Brexit. Separate UK and FrancoGerman programmes for new fighter aircraft have both embraced international partners. Agreed between the US and the Soviet Union in , the INF Treaty eliminated all conventional and nuclear-armed ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of —5, kilometres. Its demise sharpened European perceptions about the uncertain state of regional security.

Washington said that Moscow had developed and then fielded a non-compliant missile, identified as the 9M SSC-8 Screwdriver. Speaking to the US House Armed Services Committee in , Rose Gottemoeller, then the under secretary for arms control and international security, said that the US had information in that Russia was violating the treaty. Indeed, this led the US to re-examine earlier data and then conclude that Russia had started testing a ground-launched cruise missile GLCM in On 2 February , Pompeo announced that the US would suspend its INF obligations and that it intended to withdraw, so starting a six-month countdown that ended on 2 August.

Choosing not to return to compliance with its INF obligations, open-source information indicated that Russia had at that point deployed the 9M with four battalions — in Elansky, Kapustin Yar training , Mozdok and Shuya. The demise of the INF Treaty generated two significant concerns. The second was there might be procurement in Europe of such systems absent the restraining influence of the INF Treaty. The 9M is seen as particularly destabilising because it is a road-mobile system, meaning that the launch vehicle and its cruise missiles could be hard to detect.

Furthermore, the missiles could be armed with either conventional or nuclear warheads, so discerning the payload of an incoming missile might pose problems.

Some German politicians briefly considered a new dual-track decision — modelled on the choice to deploy medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe while also offering arms-control talks to the Soviet Union — while Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Jacek Czaputowicz was reported to have initially made some ambiguous statements about the desirability of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Instead, it is looking to build stronger conventional forces, improve readiness and consider new arms-control measures.

The Alliance is also considering the adaptation and potential modernisation of missile-defence systems in Europe. Alternatively, NATO could consider deploying new systems designed from the outset to take such capabilities into account.

While this could be seen as a useful starting point for an Alliance response, it does not necessarily lead to a coherent arms-control agenda. The debate in Germany included one proposal that would effectively ask Moscow to move the offending missile systems further east. Putting NATO territory out of reach of the 9M would, the argument went, constitute a confidence-building measure from which other measures might flow.

Another option, instead of expanding geographic coverage, might be to increase the functional scope of a future treaty, and by doing so look to include more, or even all, nuclear systems in an arms-control framework. Such an approach, Gottemoeller continued, could be extended to new systems entering service, such as hypersonic glide vehicles. According to planners, JSEC has the capacity to grow from its peacetime establishment of some posts to about in crisis situations. Both commands are due to reach full operating capability in This is a framework for allies to provide, by , 30 battalions, 30 combat air squadrons and 30 combat vessels at day readiness.

Meanwhile, burden sharing across the Alliance has not improved greatly, even if European NATO members in aggregate were in spending more on defence than the previous year and many had plans to spend yet more in the near term. And nobody, neither West nor Russia, should or can ask us to choose. Von der Leyen indicated that she would seek to boost the EDF, a financial instrument controlled by the Commission and designed to support defence research, development and capability development.

Between and , the EU established the conceptual basis for a defence-planning process that would assist member states in meeting their military-capability goals.

The challenge for the EU, and the European Defence Agency EDA in particular, is to make sure that the conceptual construct designed in Brussels becomes established in national processes, where decisions about defence investments and military-capability development will ultimately be made.

But important too will be how the EU looks to ensure the organisational coherence of all these defence-cooperation tools. Currently, some are managed by the EDA, which as an executive agency reports to the European Council and member states, and others — such as the EDF — are managed by the Commission.

There is otherwise a risk that a disconnect might emerge to undermine these carefully designed processes. Already, EU member states face significant capability shortfalls against the declared level of military ambition. The EU Military Staff has assessed that closing this gap requires a phased approach. Until the mids, the effort is only focused on the most likely military and security scenarios, with work on more challenging scenarios expected to be tackled between the mids and the early s.

Indeed, current modernisation and spending trends make it unlikely that EU member states will be able to close their capability gaps within the next decade. The rate in emerging and developing European countries was expected to be 1. The deceleration in the United Kingdom was less acute, but growth nonetheless slowed from 1.

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD , trade tensions are reducing global growth; they can raise tariffs and disrupt supply chains, affecting confidence and investments. In the eurozone, this is troubling Germany and Italy in particular, where GDP growth in was respectively 0.

With strong industrial and export-oriented economies, these two countries have proven more vulnerable to trade disputes that reduce demand for their exports. Meanwhile, the Turkish economy grew by only 0. Recession in Turkey was ascribed principally to financial-market pressures in , when the local currency depreciated sharply, which in turn led to high levels of inflation Mounting global commercial uncertainties and signs of weaknesses in the eurozone, combined with a long period of low inflation, led the European Central Bank ECB to lower interest rates and resume its quantitative-easing policy in a bid to stimulate eurozone economies.

The ECB now foresees interest rates staying low until mid Germany was largely responsible for the rise in European defence spending. Defence spending was projected to increase strongly in Central Europe, rising by 9. Meanwhile, defence outlays increased by 6. In contrast, defence spending fell by 3. Many NATO countries have outlined plans to increase defence spending.

This comes amid a changed security environment in Europe, with many European states perceiving a renewed security challenge from Russia and with the United States pressuring them for greater burden sharing over defence. The year marked the halfway point towards that goal.

Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between and Actual spending changes prior to , and projected spending levels post, are not reflected.

While that might be the case, and the spending trajectory might be upwards, there is still some way to go for states to reach the target by Poland, meanwhile, said it would reach 2. These spending plans will be financed by a new bank tax, supported by an August agreement between the Social Democrat—Green ruling coalition and the Centre and Liberal opposition parties.

The NATO definition encompasses broader defence-related expenses, rather than simply reflecting defence-ministry budgets. For reasons of transparency, some countries explain the differences France For instance, Denmark in clarified that in its report to NATO it added to its calculations defence revenue, healthcare for defence personnel, civilian training, pensions and UN peacekeeping operations.

Bulgaria specified that it includes transfers to public military high schools, but not pensions — the only NATO country not to do this. Each year, Italy publishes a discussion of defence-spending definitions, comparing its own calculations with how it reports to various institutions, including the IISS.

It explains how some funds for military procurement come from the Ministry of Economic Development, while some funds for military missions are allocated by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Such precision enables a better understanding of potential data discrepancies between different organisations. In Central and Southeastern Europe, the focus is on replacing Soviet-era equipment.

In late , Hungary signed contracts for equipment including new helicopters and second-hand main battle tanks. In February , Poland reported on its Technical Modernisation Programme TMP —26, which noted plans to procure combat aircraft, attack helicopters and short-range air-defence systems as key priorities. Warsaw released a new TMP in October. And Romania, which plans to increase its defence budget by In summer Bulgaria moved to purchase F fighter aircraft to replace its Soviet-era MiGs, while Slovakia selected the F in All four states are considering the acquisition of F variants.

In the region, Serbia is the exception to this procurement trend; Belgrade is taking delivery of MiG Fulcrums from Russia.

A new contract was expected in In August Bulgaria transferred the first funds as part of the contract. Croatia has been discussing the acquisition from Israel of 12 Fs, though Israel was unable to secure US approval for the sale. Serbia, meanwhile, has chosen to buy second-hand Russian and Belarusian MiGs. Athens has also sent a letter of request to Lockheed Martin concerning the price and availability for 25—30 F Lightning IIs. Turkey, however, may be heading in the opposite direction.

However, Ankara could turn to Moscow for the supply of modern combat-aircraft platforms, potentially the Su but perhaps more likely the Su Defence industry While European aerospace firms began to consolidate in the early s, the same did not happen in the naval and land sectors, with national champions still found in various European countries.

Yet there have been recent indications that rationalisation is starting to take place in these sectors as well. Although the two companies still work as separate entities, KNDS forms the basis for more integrated activities in the longer term.

However, it is unclear whether this would be welcome in Paris, as the German firm would then become the largest stakeholder in the holding. As a result, armoured-vehicle-manufacturing capabilities in the UK are now foreign-owned, although BAE itself retains manufacturing activities in this sector in Sweden and the US. In the aerospace arena, further cooperation activity in was driven more by governments than industry, principally through two major nextgeneration combat-aircraft programmes.

Following cuts to defence spending and force structures decided under her predecessors, von der Leyen was judged as having struggled to make progress in preparing the German armed forces for a future in which they would have to rebuild their capabilities for territorial and collective defence. The armed forces have started to address the post shift in European security and defence priorities and are operating under defence planning and policy guidance that assumes NATO collective defence will be the dominant mission set.

Having previously tried to turn itself into a lighter and more mobile force to support international crisis-management operations — often at significant distances — the Bundeswehr is now attempting to return to a posture where it can effectively defend NATO territory against an attack by a state-based adversary.

Defence spending Von der Leyen took over the defence portfolio in December Furthermore, current government budget- Europe firm Indra, which remains involved in Eurofighter, taking the defence-industrial lead on the Spanish side.

Earlier in the year, Sweden had also expressed its interest in the British project. France is the coordinating nation for this project; Finland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain are the other project members.

The remainder will support areas such as counter-uninhabited aerial vehicle systems, cyber situational awareness, maritime-surveillance capabilities and next-generation ground-based precision-strike capabilities.

EU defence-industrial cooperation efforts culminated in with the announcement of a Directorate General for Defence, Industry and Space included in the portfolio of the Commissioner for the Internal Market, alongside industrial and digital policies. Kramp-Karrenbauer has stated unequivocally that she is seeking 1. However, this target does not have the support of the SPD. Personnel and equipment Active-service personnel numbers stood at , in , dipping to the lowest post-war level in at , before recovering in to ,, just above the level.

To address this, Berlin launched a new strategy in October , designed to create a more flexible reserve cadre that can rapidly respond to territorial and collective-defence tasks. One motivating factor is the requirement to mobilise significant additional personnel in a defence contingency, and as such one provision is that all those leaving active service will be available for reserve duty for a period of six years, even though any duties for these regular reservists would likely remain voluntary.

The concept foresees that reserve units would be equipped like regular units. Germany also needs to take important acquisition decisions. Long-standing requirements for air and missile defence, as well as a number of naval vessels, require key decisions after delays. This policy had prevented companies based in France and the UK from exporting equipment to countries involved in the Yemen campaign. This crisis is affecting all services. The readiness crisis, however, throws this into sharp relief.

In June , Der Spiegel magazine reported on leaked documents from the German Navy, assessing that a maintenance and repair backlog means it might not be able to meet operational and NATO commitments after Then, in early August, it emerged that only just over half of Bundeswehr pilots were considered combat ready by NATO standards. These problems are the result of persistent underfunding and force-structure reductions, including some outsourcing of military maintenance, repair and overhaul capacity.

Fixing these problems will take time, as will rebuilding capabilities that were cut entirely. In , Germany started to regenerate a limited amphibious-assault capability in the form of the Seebatallion. However, it might well serve as an inflection point for Germany; Berlin will be expected to make a contribution befitting its political and economic weight.

Rebuilding the Bundeswehr for territorial and collective-defence tasks remains a work in progress. Defence-planning documents have been drawn up and a path has been charted. However, tackling all of these challenges will take time and will require more money than is currently made available in the German budget. Consequently, the new defence minister may have little choice but to continue the work started by her predecessor.

The year period to saw Polish forces take part in expeditionary operations, including in Afghanistan and Iraq, while Warsaw also started investing in a range of modern military capabilities. Meanwhile, bilateral strategic cooperation with the US received a boost in with an agreement to deploy additional US force elements on a continuous rotational basis.

Warsaw perceives that European allies would have only limited willingness to risk escalation with Russia. They were reduced from a conscript-based force of , in to an all-volunteer force of around , in Many units were dissolved, legacy platforms scrapped, and some infrastructure was converted to civilian use and then privatised. At the same time, Poland remains concerned with the possibility of non-traditional Russian actions, including cyber attacks, information operations, and criminal and covert activities, aimed at destabilising the eastern flank while also widening and exploiting divisions in NATO.

To achieve this, the document says, Moscow is ready to use force, threats and coercion. Russia is described as having developed hybrid-warfare methods and modernised its armed forces in order to reinforce its local advantage over NATO.

Contributing to expeditionary missions remains a stated goal, though at the end of the list, and as long as these do not reduce national-defence capability. Before then, NATO had only a light footprint on the eastern flank. Bilateral discussions led to the establishment of a framework for the continuous rotational presence of US forces and the deployment of larger units in times of crisis. The cost of all infrastructure investments, some yet unspecified, will be borne by Poland.

The US is also poised to complete the delayed Aegis Ashore missile-defence site in Redzikowo in Two years after its launch, Poland is participating in ten of the 34 PESCO programmes including military mobility, logistic hubs, an uninhabited ground system, harbour and littoral surveillance, software-defined radio, cyber-defence rapid-reaction teams, and autonomous maritime counter-mine systems and at the time of writing was set to launch its own PESCO project with Hungary.

A V4 EU battlegroup was on standby in the second half of and a common logistics headquarters is being prepared. Tasked with augmenting regular forces in countering hybrid-warfare or irregular activities, the TDF is a response to worries about Russia, as well as an additional source of disaster-relief assistance in peacetime.

Comprising mainly volunteers, its personnel combine their civilian careers with limited military service of a minimum of two days twice a month and an annual two-week camp. The TDF was reported at a strength of around 21, in late More reforms were launched after the Defence Concept. Plans for a 2,strong cyberdefence force were also unveiled in Centralised within the defence ministry, this force is due to be operational before A cyber component was also set up in the TDF in The military presence in the east has also been strengthened.

A fourth mechanised division, based in the northeastern city of Siedlce, has been set up and is planned to be at full strength by And modern land platforms, such as Leopard 2 main battle tanks MBTs , have been moved to easternbased units. The newest additions from are mm Krab self-propelled howitzers and mm Rak mortars integrated on Rosomak. The navy has suffered protracted underinvestment. Its most modern vessels are the Kormoran II minehunters, two more of which will enter service by , and a single Slazak patrol vessel, which has been in development since the early s and was originally planned as a corvette.

These are supported by RBSmissileequipped Orkan-class patrol boats. Sub-surface capability is limited to the single post-Soviet Kiloclass submarine and two ex-Norwegian Kobbenclass boats troubled with end-of-life wear and lack of spares.

The TMP also introduced a dedicated programme for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, both space-based satellites and micro-satellites and airborne inhabited and uninhabited platforms. An unspecified number of additional Fs will also be acquired to make up for the old MiGs and Sukhois. Poland is also acquiring two Patriot air- and missile-defence batteries under FMS. The second phase of this Wisla mediumrange air-defence programme is planned to include an even larger contract for six batteries, equipped with a new degree radar, an Integrated Battle Command System and SkyCeptor missiles.

The Narew short-range air-defence programme is still a priority, but there are as yet no details concerning dates and financing. These are to be delivered by Both the plan to replace more than 30 Mi attack helicopters Kruk and the planned acquisition of three submarines with cruise-missile capability Orka appeared in the new TMP. There is now the suggestion that these may move more rapidly than their hitherto very limited progress.

Meanwhile, debate over the operational utility of a frigate-size vessel in the Baltic Sea was judged as responsible for the halt in negotiations on the acquisition of former Australian frigates. The new TMP plans for two Miecznik-class coastal-defence vessels and six smaller Murena-class missile cutters. Sustained resource allocations have been made possible by the Act on the Technical Modernisation of the Armed Forces, which from placed a legal obligation on the government to allocate at least 1.

While defence investments have risen, from Their products range from platforms such as Si helicopters to components CM and AM parts and subsystems. Independent firms form the second group, specialising mainly in military electronics.

The third and largest group consists of state-owned companies. This pool of more than 60 individual firms has 17, employees and covers land systems, munitions, military electronics and naval platforms, producing a wide range of products, including small arms, artillery and surveillance radars, very-short-range air-defence systems, armoured vehicles and naval surface combatants.

The firms have significant assets at their disposal, including substantial production facilities, research laboratories and test ranges, yet they suffer from having a relatively ageing technological base. And it has not exported a platform, or a complete weapon system, in more than a decade.

Accessing European Defence Fund money may be more difficult, however: Poland has never participated in a European collaborative armament programme. Modernising the defence-acquisition process is another challenge. The process is widely criticised in Poland for its complexity and the large number of stakeholders, which increases the risk that programme management becomes overly cumbersome.

A central armaments agency has been proposed to alleviate these problems, though no formal procedure to establish one has ever been completed.

At the same time, they were trying to adapt to personnel reductions following changes to the conscription system, as well as disruption caused by continuing purges of officers accused of complicity in the attempted coup of July On 25 June, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ratified a new law that reduced the length of compulsory military service from 12 to six months.

On payment of a fee, compulsory service can be reduced further to one month of basic training. The overall reduction in the size of the armed forces has been accompanied by a contraction in the officer corps.

Although many of the officers were known to be hardline secularists, many were accused of being sympathisers of the exiled former Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen, who according to the Turkish authorities masterminded the failed coup. The effect on officer morale of these continuing purges was exacerbated by the widespread suspicion that promotions and appointments were increasingly politicised, with outspoken supporters of Erdogan fast-tracked for promotion.

In , Erdogan began appointing senior officers to posts normally assigned to those of a lower rank. When he did the same during the annual round of appointments in August , four one-star generals and one two-star general requested early retirement rather than take up their new posts.